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Abstract
The STAC project will develop new, for-
mal and robust models of non-cooperative
conversation, drawing from ideas in lin-
guistics, philosophy, computer science, and
economics. The project brings a state of the
art, linguistic theory of discourse interpre-
tation together with new data-driven mod-
els of agent interaction and strategic deci-
sion making. Here we discuss the project’s
linguistic underpinnings, and the concep-
tual and empirical challenges the project
faces. We also describe the project’s cur-
rent data collection activities.
1 Introduction
An assumption of all implemented dialogue sys-
tems and almost all formal work on discourse is
that agents are fully cooperative. What this means
is that agents adhere to principles such as: nor-
mally one believes what one says (e.g. (Grosz
and Sidner, 1990)) and that one normally tries to
help one’s interlocutors achieve their goals. The
latter in turn requires speakers to adopt shared
intentions; in other words, their preferences are
fully aligned, and they are sincere —they believe
what they say. Consequently, all dialogue sys-
tems to date are limited to domains where such
assumptions are sustainable, such as tourist in-
formation. But there are many scenarios where
this level of cooperativity doesn’t apply: for ex-
ample, dialogues involving complex negotiations
(Traum, 2008), or political debate (Lipman and
Sippi, 1995). In a dialogue from the Settlers of
Catan game below, (1b) is true but misleading be-
cause it implicates that B doesn’t have rock.
(1) a. A: Do you have rock?
b. B: I’ve got lots of wheat [in fact, B
has a rock]
c. A: I’ll give you 2 clay for a rock
d. B: How about 2 clay for a wheat?
e. A: I’ll give 1 clay for 3 wheat
f. B: OK, it’s a deal.
Nevertheless, here cooperativity has not broken
down entirely: (1b) supplies an (indirect) answer
to (1a), and so in contrast to an assertion such as
I won’t answer it meets at least one goal that is
associated with asking a question. Similarly, A’s
assertion (1e) attends toB’s underlying goal in ut-
tering (1d), of obtaining clay. We also note here
that such dialogue contributions describe the pref-
erences of individuals, so that modelling complex
preferences will be a key feature of dialogue state
representation for STAC.
2 Data collection: Settlers of Catan
We are currently collecting non-cooperative dia-
logue data using an online version of the pop-
ular board game “Settlers of Catan” (see figure
1). Negotiation dialogues are a critical part of the
game, and information hiding and deception are
observed in the data. The original JSettlers inter-
face was developed by (Thomas and Hammond,
2002), and we have modified it to include a chat
tool whereby players’ trading dialogues are being
collected (Guhe and Lascarides, 2012). An an-
notation scheme for non-cooperative negotiation
dialogues is being developed in the project.
3 Project components
3.1 Modelling Preferences
Just as the dynamic semantics of SDRT treats an
utterance as a relation between information states,
we will treat utterances as relations or transitions
between preference states. These states reflect the
Figure 1: The adapted J-Settlers interface
structure and logical dependencies among the var-
ious factors that influence agent behaviour. Con-
ditional preference (CP) nets (Boutilier et al.,
2004) provide a computationally effective and
highly compact representation for expressing and
reasoning with preferences over large sets of fea-
tures, and we will use this in our model. CP-nets
provide an effective way to handle the fact that di-
alogue often reveals complex preferences, incor-
porating dependencies between features. STAC
will determine algorithms for uncovering prefer-
ences from conversation.
3.2 Modeling Non-Cooperative Dialogue
Segmented Discourse Representation Theory
(SDRT) has a well articulated theory of dia-
logue, which provides a clear and formal interac-
tion between attributions of attitudinal states and
discourse contributions (Asher and Lascarides,
2003). The dynamics of SDRT allows us to con-
strain agent modelling, restricting search over
actions and preferences (Asher and Lascarides,
2008). However, SDRT’s cognitive logic, as de-
tailed in (Asher and Lascarides, 2003), is a static,
BDI logic that fails to reflect the structural com-
plexity of decision problems, and it has nothing
to say about less than completely cooperative and
infallible agents. Work in STAC is replacing this
cognitive model to address these shortcomings.
3.3 Statistical models and Machine Learning
We are also exploring how reinforcement learn-
ing (RL) — a statistical planning method for ac-
quiring optimal dialogue policies (see e.g. (Rieser
and Lemon, 2011)) — can be used to learn opti-
mal strategic dialogue policies. A new challenge
for RL is to work in non-cooperative domains
such as resource negotiation in Settlers, where an
agent may not be fully honest when expressing
their preferences. This type of partial observabil-
ity falls outside the scope of current Partially Ob-
servable Markov Decision Process (POMDP) ap-
proaches to dialogue, which focus on uncertainty
derived from speech recognition errors. Finding
a suitable generalization of the POMDP framework
to handle such data is an important challenge for
the STAC project.
4 Future Work
As well as using the Settlers domain, the STAC
project is also exploring data from debating di-
alogues (Lipman and Sippi, 1995). Please see
http://www.irit.fr/STAC/
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